Nitrogen applied before planting is more vulnerable to lobs to the environment than nitrogen applied during the gro~ving season, but the growing season application can increase the risk o f lower yields c;iused by adverse weather that prohibits farmers to cornplete N application. An expected utility framework is used to illustrate the potential econo~nic benefit of insurance for :I farmer to reduce this risk cost. An expected-value variance analysis is used to illustr;~te the potential benefit of insurance to Iowa corn growers who apply N fertilizer only during the growing season.
made available to famiers a variety of voluntary cost-sharing programs in the 1996 Farm Bill to entice adoption of best nitrogen management practices. For example, under the Environmental Qcrality Incentives Programs, the government can pay up to 75 percent of the cost of nitrogen management pl-actices over a five-to-ten-year period (Federal Agriculture Iniprovement and Reform Act (FAIR)). Additionally, the government has recently proposed a variety of public policies to help farniers adopt nitrogen management practices to improve N use efficiency and reduce N losses to the environment (e.g., Clean Water Action Plan).
Timing application of N fertilizer to coincide with the nitrogen need of a crop can avoid excessive application of N and reduce the amount of residual nitrogen lost to the environment.' A split or a single application of N fertilizer during the growing season can rnatch N supply to the crop's need without a reducThe author is an agricultural economist with the USDA, Economic Research Service, 1800 M Street tion in yield and can be a least costly practice NW. washington D,C, 20036 . ~h~ ,,iews expressed i n for N fertilizer application. Many farmers in this study are those of the authors and do not neccssarily reflect the views of the USDA. The author thanks Richard Magleby, Robert Dis-' The amount of residual nitrogen is the amount of mukes. and anonymous reviewers for valuable com-N applied to a field in excess of the amount of N in rilents and suggestions. Responsibility for any errors or the hrrrvested crop and crop residue removed from the omissions rests solely with the author. field (Meisinger; Huang).
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the United States already have adopted such a timing practice. However, many farmers still apply N fertilizer in the fall or early spring before planting (Taylor) . There are various reasons fat-farmers to apply N fertilizer before planting ( B u n d y ; Hoeft) . Some farmers prefer a fall application because they w~unt to have their fieldwol-k done in the fall to avoid possible delays in planting in the spring. Some farmers with clay soils may prefer a fall application because they want to avoid the compaction of soil caused by the operation of the heavy fertili~er spreading equipment during the growing season. Some farmers practice fall application because they can minimize N loss in soils that have a low leaching potential by adding N inhibitors and by applying N before planting when the temperature is low. Yield loss and income variation caused by weather conditions during the growin, *7 season are the main concerns that discourage most fat-tners from growing season application of N fertilizer application (Bundy; HoeA). Unfavorable weather conditions during the growing season can stop the farmer from entering the field to apply N fertilizer, and lack 01' N can reduce crop yield and cause an income loss to the farmer. 'The cost of bearing this income risk may be so large (or at least be perceived to be so large) that the adoption of growing season N application may not help the farmer improve the certainty equivalent (CE) net income (the expected net income subtracted by the risk cost) (Huang, Hewitt, and Shank) . Furthertilore, even though the adoption tnay improve the CE net income, the possibility of income losses in sotne years may not be acceptable to a safety-first, risk-averse farmer who needs to ~naintain a certain level of annual net farrn income. Research has found that farmers generally are risk averse (e.g.. Wilson and Eidman; Tauer). To motivate risk-averse farmers to adopt better timing of N fertilizer application, risk-management tools such as insurance can be employed to help farmers reduce the real or perceived risk cost.
An adoption insurance progl-am can reduce farmers' risk cost associated with the adoption of a specific practice. Such a PI-ogram transfers risk from one insurance participant (farmer) to other participants who are more able or willing to bear the risk cost and to an insurance company or the government for whom the bearing of risk is less costly. An insurance company through risk-pooling can offer insurance to a participating farmer at a cost that is less than his or her perceived risk costs (Newbet-y and Stigliz). Such insurance may enable individual farmers to increase their CE net income by adopting a risky but environmentally ft-iendly best-nutrient managemelit practice, which they w o~~l d not otherwise adopt. Participation in an adoption insurance prograln can be voluntary for the fiu-mers who currently are adopting the practice or planning to adopt it.
An adoption insurance program also allows an insurance company to improve its net income by capturing the difference between thc amount that the farmer is willing to pay for the risk reduction and the reduced risk cost that the insurance company is able to achieve by risk-pooling. Currently, sotne insurance companies arc marketing an insurance policy tailored to the adoption of a split-N application before and after planting to reduce N use (Agricultural Conservation Innovation Center). When the insurance program benefits both the farmers and the insurance company. society as a whole benefits 1'1-om the increased net farm income by the adoption--a Pareto optimal move to increase social benetit.
The objective of this study is to illustrate the potential econo~nic and environmental henetits of using insurance to provide farmers incentive to adopt a growing-season-only (GSonly) application instead of' a before-plantingonly (RP-only) application of N fertilizer. The potential effect of insurance on the financial gain to farmers and the I-eduction of N fertilizcr use to reduce residual N that tnay be lost to the environment will be demonstrated. Also. the adoption of a GS-only N fertili~er application for continuous corn production in Iowa is used to illustrate the potential benetit of adoption insurance. Under a GS-only insurance policy. if an insured farmer can't apply N fertilizer during the ?rowing season and has a lower income than expected, he or she will be compensated for the loss of revenue through the indemnity. T h e fanner's yield history is used to calculate indemnities and premiums. To qualify for an indemnity, the insured farmer must keep field records.
Why Adoption Insurance?
A simple static insurance model is employed to demonstrate how insurance can increase a risk-averse farmer's incentive to adopt a GSonly N fertilizer application. T h e model assumes that a farmer's decision to adopt a GSonly application is based on maximizing his or her expected utility of net returns. The ass~~r n e d utility function exhibits positive but climinishing marginal utility. A farmer adopts a GS-only N fertilizer application if it results in a greater expected utility of net farm income (net return) than the expected utility of using other application alternatives. T h e advantage of insurance is ill~~strated by comparing the expected utility of models with and without insurance.
Assume that thcre ;ire two states of nature. In the bad state, a farmer perceives a probability (p) of not being able to apply N fertilizer during the growing season, thus suffering a yield loss and a reduced net income, Z,. In the good state. he or she perceives probability ( 1 -p) of being able to apply N fertilizer in the growing season. receiving a net income Z,. Thus the farmer's expected net incorne before insurance is a random variable Z defined by (Huang, Hewitt. and Shank):' -C(N,) . with probability ( I -p).
( 2 ) Z , = I I , Y ( N , I N ; = O ) I~, N , , -C ( N , , ) , with probability p.
' Both Z> and Z, are deterministic and determined primarily by their expected yield functions. These yield functions ideally should be estimated by using the time-serics yield data from a specific site, which generally reflccts the effect of the annual random variation of the weather condition (such as wet. normal, or d r y ) (Feinerman, Choi and Johnson) .' For an optimal N,. the farmer will have to apply more N fertilizer in the spring before planting than after planting because (I -( I ) of N applied before planting will not be available for crop growth in the growing season. C(N,,) iund C(N,q) are field operution costs for applying N,, and N,, respectively. These two costs are assumed to be constants.
A risk-averse farrner determines the optimal timing of N fertilizer application and its N application rates, N,, and N,, by the tnaximization of the expected utility function (3)
The optimal application timing can be : un N application before planting. or a split-N (SN) application before planting and after planting, or a growing season application.
T h e model can be used to evaluate the advantage of switching to new application timing and the need for insurance if the farmer perceives a probability ( p ) of being ~tnable to apply N fertilizer during the growing season (Huang, Hewitt and Shank When U ( Z ) , is lev, than U ( Z ) , , however, insurance may be useful to help farmers increase their expected utility of the GS-only application to exceed the expected utility of the BP-only application. This is described next.
When the adoption insurance is available to the farmer, the net income with insurance i 4 a random variable V given by (4) 1 : = Z, -p, with probability ( 1 --p). An insurance program uses a mean-preserving risk-reducing method to help farmers reduce risk cost and thereby increase their expected utility of adopting a risky N application timing (Newbery and Stigliz 1981). Insurance reduce s the spread of distribution of net incomes between the good state and the bad state, while keeping the mean value unchanged. By doing so it reduces the farmer's income risk (riskbearing cost). As shown in equations (4) and ( 5 ) , insurance reduces the spread of net income\ between the good state and the bad \rate by \~tbtracting an insurance premium P from the net income of the good state and by adding the payoff (I -P) to the net income of the bad \tare. When the farrner pay\ an actuarially fair insurance premium, insurance doe\ not change the mean value of net income
but it reduce\ variance V u r ( V ) to 0 for full coverage of the loss ( Z , -Z,).4 Because the farmer receive\ E [Z] annually regardless of good or bad state, the utility corresponding to thi\ annual net income is ---istration cost to be charged by the insurance Substituting p(l + cu) I for p, where I -1.7, -company for the service. If the farmer is of-Z,], in equations (4) and (5) . it can be shown that E I V ] fered an actuarially fair insurance premium,
If the farmer pays an actuarially fair in-z,)( I -p(l t u ) ) ] = ( 1 -p ) Z, + p 2, -p w r = surance premium, the farmer can maximize his Er.71 -A, and that I1ur(V) = p(I -p)[Z, -p ( I tor her expected utility by choosing a full cov-
When the farmer pays an act~larially fair insurance prcerage of losses (Nelson and Loehnian; Ashan, [,iLll, ( , = (I), the cxpecred net income is not changed Ali, and Kurian).
ElV] = ELZl.
, which, according to Jensen's inequality, is always greater than U(Z) when an insurance program is absent. Thus an insurance program provides farmers an opportunity to reduce their risk cost to maximize their expected ~ltility of net income. By switching from a BP-only practice to a GS-only practice. the farmer increases liis/her expected utility as much ar the difference between U(E[Z]), and U(Z),,-the difcrence between the utility of expected net return of adopting a GS-only practice and the ulility of the current BP-only practice. Assuming the application of the BPonly practice is always possible, the maximum income that the fi~rmer gets, therefore, is the difference between E [ Z ] , and E[Z],,; that is the difference between the expected net income of a GS-only application and the expected net income of the BP-only application. When the insurance premium includes the cost of insurance service ( a > 0). the farmer's CE net I-eturn is reduced. An insurance program improves the farmer's CE net return only if the difference between the expected net return of a GS-only application and the cost of insurance service is greater than the expected net return of a BP-only application. That is, (EIZI, -A ) must be greater than E [ Z ] , , .
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Will insurance affect a risk-averse f~~rnier's N fertilizer application rate? This can be determined by comparing the rule for determining N fertilizer application rate without and with insurance. In the no-insurance case, a riska\.erse farmer determines optimal N fertilizer application rates N,, and N, by the following first-order condition (9) and ( 10) obtained from the maximization of (3) With the presence of insurance, the riskaverse farmer deter~nines the optimal a m o~~n t s of N,, and N, for-full coverage by the firstorder condition\ of the model (7) The influence of insurance o n I-etluction of the N fertilizer application rate is investig~~ted undcr three scenarios: (a) the fitr~ner pays an actuarially fair insurance p r e~n i~t m
the farmer pays an insurance premium including an actuarially fair insur~tnce premium and the cost for administering insur~tnce (cu > 0). and ( c ) the Farmer is sub.;idized for a portion of the insurance premium (oc < 0).
In the first scenario ( a = O), thc first-order conditions ( 14) and (IS) become the first-order conditions for the risk-neutral farmer. By comparing the first-order conditions for the neutral fi~rmer with the first-order conditions (9) and ( 10) for the risk-averse farmer. Huang, Uri and Hansen (1993) showed that for a given level of p, the risk-neutral farmer will apply an equal amount or less N fertilizer than a riskaverse farmer for the same yield level, assuming all other things are equal. An insurance program thus induces a risk-averse farmer to reduce thc N fertilizer application rate.
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In the second scenario ( a > 0), the risk-study of insurance when the expected utility averse farmer also may reduce the N fertilizer application rate, but the reduction is smaller than under the tirst scenario. This is because the probability weight [ (14) is less than the probability weight (I -p), and the probability weight [(I + a ) pl in equation (14) is larger than the probability weight p when u = 0 in equation (14). The smaller probability weight for the successful application implies that the farmer will apply more N fertilizer. It sliould be noted that a can not be so large that the utility of expected net return. E [ Z ] , -p a (Z, -Zi), becomes less than the utility of the BP-only practice, U(Z),,. If this happens, the farmer will not have an incentive to adopt a GS-only N fertilizer application.
In the thirci scenario ( a < 0), the riskaverse farmer also reduces the N fertilizer application rate, the reduction is larger than under the tirst scenario. In this scenario the f'arnier's insurance premium is reduced (or subsidized). The probability weight 1 ( 1 + a ) pl in equation (14) is smaller than the probability weight p in equation (14) when cu = 0. The smaller probability weight for the failing application implies that the farmer with insurance will apply less N fertili~er than the farmer in the first scenario. For example. if tu = -1 (insurance premium is fully subsidized), the rule (first-order conditions ( 14) and ( 15 )1 to determine N fertilirer application rate becomes />, dY(N,)liiN, -/>/ = 0. For this rule the optimal tirning of N application is always a GS-only application regardless of the value of p, implying that less N fertili~er will be applied. The presence of insurance, thel-et'ore, may incluce a risk-averse fxrmer to reduce N-tkrtilizer use by behaving like a risk-neutral farmer in making the fertilizer use decision. As thc risk-averse farmer switches the application timirig from n BP-only to a GS-only application. the reduction in N fertilizer use can be very substantial.
An Expected-Value Variance For~nulation for an Empirical Analysis
function of the farmer is unknown. Using the EV analytical framework, maximization of expected utility of net income (EU(Z)) is formulated as the n~axiniiration of expected-value variance of net income, which is CE net return (income). (For a discussion of validity of an EV formulation to approximate a utility function, see Anderson, Dillon. and Hardaker; Robison anci Barry: Newbery and Stigliz.) A risk-averse farmer will select a practice that maximizes CE net return with respect to N fertilizer applied. For the random variable Z denoting the net return from adopting an N fertilizer tirning application (defined by ( 1 ) and (2)), the CE net return is defined as where Vclr(Z) is the variance of net return which, in this study. is p ( l -p ) ( Z , -Z,)'; y is an assumed absolute risk-aversion coefficient, which is assumed to be 0.02 for a strong riskaverse farmer (Boggess ancl Ritcliie 1988) .' y l 2 V"/r(Z) is the risk cost. Using this EV i'ramework and assuming a large number of farmers who have identical and independent risk (Robison and Barry). the range for an insurance premium P''' for CS-only application is shown in (17):
The lower hound in (17) is the minimum insurance premium-the actuarially fair insurance premiurn--which the insurance company must charge the farmer for a full coverage of income loss to maintain an actuarially sound insurance service. The upper bound is the ' The absolute risk-averse coefticient is a kc) parameter for estimating the risk p r -e~n i u~~~. It varies from 0 for a risk-neutral t'arrner to a posirilc value (hr n I-ish-averse farmer. As the value increahe\. the farmer becomcs mol-e risk-averse. Different levels of value have been sugpehted for a rihk-aver\e farmer by re\carchers (tluang, Hewitt. and Shank). maximum insurance-the actuar-idly fair insurance plus the ~naxilnirm risk cost to the farmer-which is the maximum insurance premium that the farmer is willing to pay for insurance. At this maximum insurance premium for GS-only application. the fi~rnler who currently practices a GS-only application would be indifferent towards participating or not participating in an insurance program.
A sustainable insurance premium, P')::*, for the adoption of a GS-only application rnust be both actuarially sound to an insurance company and also must provide a farmer who currently practices a BP-only application with an incentive to switch to a GS-only application.
If the farmers select a full coverage, P''"k must be greater than the actuarially fair insurance premium plus the cost of administering the insurance program (A). It also must ensure that the amount of the expected net income with insurance (ELV]) (= Z, -P, which can be derived from (4) and ( S ) ) , is greater than the expected net income of the current BP-only ( E I Z ] , , ) . Llsing these two inequalities, a sustainable insurance premium for the adoption of a GS-only applic~rtion must satisfy the following condition.
The potential benefit of an insurance program can be assessetl by inequality (18). A riskaverse farmer can expect to improve CE net income if the insurance premium is less than tlie clifl'erence in net income between a successful GS-only application ( Z , ) and the expected net income of the current BP-only application (EIZ],,). If the farmer only pays the actuarially fair insurance premium. helshe can capture the potential maximum gain in CE net income, which is the difference in the expected net incorne between the GS-only npplication and the BP-only a p p l i~a t i o n .~ 
An Iowa Case Study
An Iowa ca\e study i\ used to illustrate the potential economic and environmental benefits of using an insurance program for the adoption of a GS-only N fertilizer application. Agricultural production in Iowa provides an excellent setting in which to study the adoption of better N fertili~er application timing to improve N use efficiency. Of lnajor corn growing states, Iowa has the largest percentage of corn acres receiving N fertilizer in the fall and in the spring before planting. Results from the Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS) sirrvey for 1996' show that 20 percent of planted acres in lowla received N fertilizer only in the fall and about 41 percent of planted acres I-eceived N fertili~er only in the spring. while only about 8 percent of planted acreu received N fertilizer exclusively during the growing season. As noted previously, N fertili~er appl ieci in the fall or the spring before pliunting is vulnerable to losses to the environtnent. Corn acres currently using a BP-only N fertilizer application will be targeted for the adoption of a GS-only N fertilizer application to improve N use efficiency. It is assumed that the farmer currently practices a BP-only IV fertilizer application for corn, which is always possible to complete before plant in^. and that the farmer who adopts a GS-only N fertilizer application may not be able to enter-the field to apply N fertilizer during the growin, -season in some years due to adverse weather.
The model requires the e\t~matron of tlie farmer'\ perceived probability ( p ) and the estimation of the production function ( Y ) . A weather ' In IC)9h, the U.S. Depnrcmenc o f Agriculture conducted the Agricultural Rc\oul.ce\ hlanagcmcnt Study ( A R M S ) . Annual data were collectecl on krtilirer and pesticide use, tillage system\ employccl. cropping sccluences. wllether the cropland is designated a s highly erodible. and inforrnntion on the use of other inputs ant1 production practices. The survey covered corn. cotton. soybeans, wheat (winter, \ p i n g and durum). and Imtatoe\. Only \elected states were surveyed, but ~thout XO percent of the total planted acreage for the re\pcctive crops were covered. simulation model was used to determine the farmer's perceived probability that he or she [nay 11ot be able to apply N fertilizer during the growing season and a regression analysis was used to estimate a production function of different N application timings. Historical weather conditions, machinery capacity. soil type. and labor availability during the growing season are key f~~c t o r s that determine the probability. In this study only the precipi~ation during the :rowing season was considereci. W~~terloo. and Ottumwa. The sirnulation model estimated the probability of daily precipitation .\-in each of these three weather zones for June and July. The probability that u farmel-will not be able to apply N fertilizer during these two months was P ( s > I . ) . where r-was the tnaxi~num daily precipitation that would make soil conditions such that i t would be difficult or impossible for machinery to enter the field. The \.nlue of I . was between 0.25 inches and 0.5 inches. depending o n soil type (Cruse) . The averages of the estimated probabilities for the three weather zones were used in this study. The averages were p ( s > 0.25 inches) = 0.15 and p(.r > 0.5 inches) = 0.10.
These esti~nates are consistent with the estimates used by Feinel-man, Choi, and Johnson.
Production functions were cstimatecl by using cross-section data from the 1906 ARMS survey. The estimated production function can be interpreted :IS the yield function for the "average field" in 1own.V~ampling methods and data collection techniques used in the An icieal set o f data Ibr c5tirn;lring a psocluctio~l function fol-;I I-cprcsentativc held would he from the ti~nc bet-ies data obtained o\.er year.; [rorn contsollccl experiments with vasicd timings of N fcslili~cr application ant1 from vario~ls expel-i~nent h i t e b with clit'l'erent qite V;II-iables. Sucli data i \ currently not ;i\ail;tble for this i t i~d y . 1996 ARMS are given by Kott and Fetter. A total of 1009 cornfields were surveyed in lowa. The data used for estimating the production function were restricted in this study so as to isolate the impact of N fertilizer applied on yield. The sample used in the estimation included only the fields where farmel-s grew full-season corn without applying manure and planted cover crops in winter and where they planted corn the last two years without the use of N inhibitors. Under these conditions the I996 ARMS survey yielded 63 usable observations representing 962.000 acres. About 51 percent of these acres had N fertilizer applied during the spring only before planting and 9 percent had N fertilizer applied only in the fall.
Three functional specifications were used to evaluate the corisistency of the estimates of the relationship between corn yield and the timing 01' N fertili~er application. The specifications used included a quadl-atic !QD) function. the linear-plateau (LP) function. and the Mitscherlich-Baule ( M B ) function. The quadratic function exhibits diminishing marginal returns. the linear-plateau function places n plateau o n the yield response to N, and the Mitscherlich-Baule function exhibits dirninishing marginal returns with an asymptotic yield pli~tcau in response to N fertilizer application (Frank, Beatie. and Embleton: Beattie and Tuy lor).
The st:uidartl least-square method in SAS (Slatistical Analysis System) procedures was used for the estirnation. The estimation results are shown in Table I . Collinearity and heteroscedasticity testing reveals that estimation of each production function is acceptable. Two esti~nated coefficients. rl aricl n l , are particularly important for this study. Coefficient tl is used to estimate the efficiency of N fertili~er applied belhre planting. It represents the percentage of N fertilizer applied before planting that is available for plant uptake during the growing season. Coefficient r r l , the intercept. is the expected corn yield if the farmer fails to apply all fertilizers. These tuc) estimates. tl in the growinp beason. P altd K are the aniounth. re\pectivel),. of phosphate and potash L~pplied and (11, rl, (12. ( I . + . h l , h-7, and 7'are coel'licietlts to he esti~~~atcci. a n d t r l . obtained from each o f the three productions are cornparable.
T h e estimated LP function w a s ~~s c c i I-c>r the illustration. It w a s helected for the illustration o v e r the other t w o functions because it has the largest adjusted R -s q~~i~r e d a m o n g three yield functions consiclercd. T h e appropriateness of' using the estimated LP function against the other t w o estimated functions w a s investigated u s i n g a n o n -n e s t e d J -t e s t ( D n v i d s o n a n d Mackinnon). Test results indicated the LP function is appropriate at the statistically significant level less than 0.0 I. T h e estimate o f the intercept a1 ( 8 4 . 8 0 bus./ac.) f o~r n d t o b e relatively higher ~h a n the estimate (65 bus./ ;LC.) which Voss a n d Shrader obtained in their study o f long-term continuous corn yields without application of N fertilizer. T h i s differe n c e is expected because in this study s o m e of N absorbed by the plant is from the carryover N in the soil. Also. the cstirtiate o f the efficiency ti ( 0 . T h e estimated probabilities and the LP production function w e r e used to construct an E V model to assess the potential economic benetit o f adoption insurutice t o a risk-averse farmer. T h e potential economic benetit w a s assessed by comparing the farmer's CE net return from adopting a GS-only N application without insurance a n d the 11ct return w h e n i l~s~~r c c l .
T h e 
(Certainty Ecluivalent Net K~I L I I -n )
.'The relatively low N fcrtili/er applic;ition rate I-eflects a large amount of soil-N in lowa soil. Even if the fa~-met. in one ye;lr-misses the N l'ertilircr application during the growing season. he or she still can expect to harvest 84.80 bushel5 of corn per act-e. C o l~t i n u o~~s l y ])lining soil-N can tleplete soil-N unci [nay 11ot be sust:tinable and an increase of the application r;itt. may he nccclecl t o rctluce the tnining.
" For a ri\k-ncut~.al frirtiicr. expected net revenue = =robs revenue -N fertilircr coqt -tirld operation cost. For a riskavel-se farmel; certainty ccluivolent net return = expected riet revenue -risk pretr~iu~n.
procedure to assess the benefit included three parts. The tirst part determined the optimal N application timing and the cost of adopting a GS-only practice without insurance (the haseline scenario). The second part determined the ranges of the sustainable insurance premium for the adoption of the CS-only application and the potential economic benefit of the adoption insurance to a risk-averse Farmer. The third part compared the farmer's C E net return from adopting a CS-only application without insurance and net returns when insured. In this case study the administrative cost and the problems associated with adverse selection, moral hazard, and the c o~~e l a t i o n of events were not addressed because the requisite data was not available. The price of' corn was assumed to be $2.45 per bushel and the price of N Sertili~er $0.2 per pound (USDA). The broadcasting cost of N fertilizer including fixed and tield operation costs for a BP-only application was assurned to be $3.62 per acre. and a side-dressing application cost for : I GSonly application was assurned to be $6.65 per acre (Doster).
The N fertilizer application timing decision model was employed to determine the optimal N fertilizer application timing for lowa farmers who continuously plant corn annually on the same field. The optimal N fertili~er application rate. optimal timing. and expected net revenue for a risk-neutral and a risk-averse farmer are presented in Table 2 . When the perceived problibility ( p ) of the farmer failing to apply N fertilizer during the growing season is 0.10, the optim;~l application timing for a risk-neutral farmer is a GS-only application, applying 60.05 pounds of N fertilizer before planting, yielding 135.61 bushel of corn. For the risk-averse farmer, the optimal application timing is a BP-only application for, applying 173.56 pounds of N fertili7.er before planting. Thus the risk-avel-se farmer applies 1 13.5 1 pounds N fertilizer rnore than the risk-neutral farmer for a gain of about 5.64 bushels of corn.
When the perceived probability of the farmer failing to apply N fertili~er during the growing season is 0.15 for the risk-neutral farmer, the optimal N fertilizer application tinling is also a GS-only application, applying 60.05 pounds of N fertili~er after planting and yielding 132.78 bushels of corn. For the riskaverse farmer, the optimal N fertilizer application timing is an also a BP-only application, applying 173.56 pounds of N fertilizer before planting, yielding 14 1.25 bushels of corn per acre. This result indicates that the risk-averse farmer applies 1 13.5 1 pounds of N fertilizer more than the risk-neutral farmer fi>r a gain of about 8.47 bushels of corn.
For the risk-averse farmer, the optirnal application rates and yields of the BP-only application are comparable to the survey's average application rate and yield. The optinial application rates ( 173.56 pounds for p = 0.1 and for p = 0.15) are co~nparable to the survey's average application rate (1 54.00 pounds) of the BP-only application. The optimal yields (14 1.25 bushels for p = 0.10, and for p = 0. 15) are also comparable to the survey's average yield (135.60 bushels). Because the adoption of the GS-only application can reduce N-fertilizer use substantially, developing an insurance program to provide a farmer incentive to adopt a GS-only application is the focus of next investigation.
Cost of A~lopting CI G S -o n l~ Ap/dic(~tion bt'itlzout I t l s~~m n c e
For a risk-averse farmer when p = 0.10. a switch of N fertilizer application timing frorn a BP-only application to a GS-only application can cost the farmer $5.18 of CE net return ($302.55-307.73) (Table 3 ). This result indicates that in the absence of insurance a riskaverse farmer will not adopt a GS-only N fertilizer application. The cost nlainly comes from the risk-premium ($12.88 ). An insurance program that reduces this cost potentially enhances the farmer's incentive to adopt a GSonly application. A program that reduces this risk-premium to zero would allow the farmer to have an increase in CE net return of $7.70 per acre (the difference i n expected net income between the GS-only and the BP-only practice) by switching frorn a BP-only application to a GS-only application.
When p = 0.1 5 (Table 3) , a risk-averse farmer without insurance would have a larger reduction in CE net return, about $16.52, by switching N fertilizer application tirning from the BP-only to a GS-only application. An insurance prograln would help a farmer adopting a GS-only application increase CE net return by reducing risk cost ($18.25) and thereby increasing CE net return ($1.76). Sincc this gain ($1.73) is relatively small, the insurance tilay not provide the farmer adequate incentive to adopt the GS-only application. A s p increases, the cxpccted net income of the GS-only decrease4 and hecomes smaller than the expected net income of the RP-only application. In such situations, insurance would not provide the farmer incentive to adopt the practice.
First. the mauirnum insurance premium ot' P'!' that induces a risk-averse farnier currently using the GS-only application to be indiffctrnt to eithel-participating or not participating in a GS-only insurance program can be determined. A s s~~r n e the farmer buys insurance for fitll coverage of yield loss in the case of failing to apply N during the growing season, and the cost of insurance service is zero ( t w -0). (Table 3) . With thic niauinii~m insurance pre~nium of $24.85. ho\\~e\rer, 21 farmer c u r r e~~t l y using the RP-only application may have no incentive to switch N fertili~e r application timing frorn : I BP-only t o a GS-only application. This i \ b e c a~~s e the CE net return ($302.55) is lcss than the CE net return of $307.73 for a BP-only N fertili/.er al7plic:ltion. A reduction in the insurance premium f c~ full-yield cotrcrage is needed to ensure that the farmer will have the requihite incentive to switch production practices.
Next. the hi~stainahle insurance premiums for which u risk-averse farmer would be \ilill-ing to switch from the BP-only t o lie GS-only application and pay for the coverage of full yield loss can be determined by inequality (18). The m a x i m u~n sustainable insurance premium (P'!"'') that the farmer would be indifferent to switching N fertilizer application from a BP-only to a GS-only application or not is $19.66 (the upper bound of inequality ( 18)). By ilnple~nenting risk sharing (pooling) anlvllg participating farmers. the insurance company may be able to ]-educe the insurance pren~ium from $19.66 to ;1n actuarially fair premiu~n of $1 1.96 @ I ) , assurning that the risk for an individual farmer is independent of the risk for other farmers. This is thr ~u i~l i m u m si~stainable insurance premium to the farmer. I-eprescnting ; I saving of $ 12.88 to the f'ar~ner."' If this saving in added to the CE net return ($302.55) . there will be an increase in the farmer's CE net return to $315.43, which is $7.70 greater than the CE net return (of $307.73) of a BP-only applicatiotl. The l'arlncr. therefol-e. after paying the minimum insurance p t -C I~~L I~I of $1 1.96 for the insur:lnce coverage. will realize a $7.70 increase of CE net return. This is the maximum the farmer would gain from adopting the C;S-only N fertilizer application. If' an insut-ance company incurs sorne administrative cost, the ad~ninistrativc cost A must be less than $7.70 for the insurance prozr;vn to be strstninable. Thus a sustainable in--sut-ance prernium will have to be between $1 1.96 and $19.66 for full-yield coverage insurance.
Similarly, a sustainable insurance program also can be designcd for p = 0.15 that would provide farmer4 an incentive to adopt a GSonly N fertilizer application. In this case the gain h-om an insurance program for the adoption of a GS-only application is I-elati~,ely srnall ($1.76), i f the farnier pays an a c~u~u -i d l y fair insut-~unce p~-e~n i u m of S17.93. The estimotcd range for a suctainable insurance pret n i u~n f o r full-yield coverage is between $17.93 2nd $19.66. Table 4 sun~rnarizes the potential benetits of the adoption insurance for a GS-only N fer- erage application rate per year is the product of a successful GS-only application rate (60.05 in Table 2 ) and probability of a successful GSonly application (I -p). The reduction of RN is quite large compared with the reduction in RN computed from the survey data. The average reduction in R N from the survey data is about 19 pounds per acre, which is only about one sixth of the model's result (Table 5) ing that the farmer pays the act~~arially fair insurance premiums. The gain in CE net return is sensitive to changes in the efficiency of Nfertili~er applied before planting (Table 7) . The gain diminishes as the N-efticiency (cl) and the probability (p) of not applying N during the growing season increases. When cl is greater than 0.50, the gain becomes negative, implying that insurance will not help the farmer improve his or her CE net return in adopting a GS-only N application. Similarly. when p is greater than 0.15 and d is greater than 0.346, insurance may not be helpful to the farmer. The farmer will be better off by staying with the BP-only application. The potential reduction of residual N nitrogen as the farmer switches from the BP-only application to the insured GS-only application reduces 200 pounds to less than 100 pounds as the value of N-efficiency incl-eases. These results imply that adoption insurance is most useful to the farrner with the sandy-soil cropland where N loss is large (d is small) and where the probability of not being able to apply N fertilizer during the growing season is small because of good drainage.
Concluding Remarks
The potential economic and environmental benefits of using insurance to help a riskaverse farmer adopt a better nitrogen nianagement practice of timing N fertilizer application to reduce N loss to the environment were analytically and empirically investigated. The empirical results presented here are general because of the limitations of data and the assurnptions used in this study. Adoption insurance is very farm-specific just as life insurance is specific to individuals. The design of insurance program must be based on long-run pooled cross-sectional (for estimating N-efticiency) and time series (for estimating expected net returns) data on N-fertilizer and crop yields. Site-specific infortnation, such as soil type and weather cotlditions. are required to estimate the production function. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates that there is a potential for insi~rance to provide a farmer incentive to adopt a GS-only application.
Other considerations must also be addressed. One key consideration is the cropping pattern. This study focuses only on farmers who plant continuous corn. Farmers can reduce their risk cost of adopting a GS-only N fertilizer application by diversifying the crops they grow. For example, soybeans can leave a substantial amount of N to soil for the subsequent production o f corn. A risk-averse f. '~rmer can reduce the production risk by growing corn after soybeans. The carry-over N tixed by soybeans will reduce the yield loss that would otherwise occur if the farmer fails to apply N during the growing season. Thus an insurance program may not be useful for n corn-soybean rotation.
The problems of moral hazard and adverse selection can also be serious. Moral hazard and adverse selection problems are often observed and well documented in crop insurance (Skees, Black, and Barnett) . An insurance program for the adoption of a GS-only application is likely to confront these same problems. Moral hazard occurs when insurance reduces .lorrr-rrcrl c ? f ' A g t * i c~~~I i~~r~~I urrd Aljl,lic,tl Ecorlori~ic,.c, April 2002 the farmer's incentive t o complete N-fertilizer application during the growing season w h e n weather is favorable f o r the farmer t o comply with the GS-only practice anti the application of N fertilizer at the optimal rate, a s required by the adoption insurance. Unlike the current crop insurance, the adoption insurance would need inexpensive ways t o monitor tlie c o~t lpliance a n d t o determine indemnity payments to avoid high administration cost that Tilay cause the adoption insurance market to fail. Adverse selection occurs when the insura n c e company cannot separate better risks frorn poor risks. T h i s has been a serious problem for c r o p insurance (Skees, Black. a n d Rarnett 1997). T h e self-insurance problern such a s the o n e addressed by Rabcock could be a particularly serious barrier for adoption insurance. Strategies (Nelson and L o e h~i~a n : N e wbery and S t i g l i t~) that have been e~n p l o y e d t o mitigate the problems of moral hazard a n d adverse selection in c r o p insurance also need to b e explored with regard t o N f e r t i l i~e r timing.
O n e strategy t o reduce tlie cost of the prog r a m might h e t o piggyback the ~~d o p t i o n insurance o n the current c r o p insurance. T h e "additional" (or Buy Up) coverage under the current c r o p insurance could b e modified to include an adoption insurance program. S u c h a strategy may allow the adoption insurance to share the rish cost a n d the program administration with the current crop insurance program. Pilot studies woulcl be needed t o explore the feasibility o f this alternative. F~u m e r s in the area where nitrate leaching is severe could b e offered an insurance option t o foster ndoplion o f a better application timing.
